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In recent months it has become apparent that military planners
in both the Soviet Union and the United States have been striving
to develop operational anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. Though the
United States has limited its efforts to the production of a non-nu-
clear, non-explosive device capable of accomplishing its objective
simply by colliding with a targeted satellite,' the Soviet Union is on
the verge of deploying a non-nuclear weapon designed to destroy
or neutralize a targeted satellite by explosion.2 Moreover, the Sovi-
ets allegedly continue to work toward production of an operational
nuclear weapon,3 known as a directed-energy weapon, capable of
focusing and projecting charged, destructive atomic particles at the
speed of light.'
1. Washington Post, Sept. 23, 1977, § 1, at 1, col. 1. The Air Force recently awarded
Vought Corporation of Dallas, Texas, a 58.7 million dollar contract to build the weapon. It is
a highly maneuverable, heat-sensing vehicle, cylindrical in shape, one foot in length and
eight inches in diameter. According to the article, it could be carried into space by any
number of rockets launched from earth or airplane. Thereafter, it would be released and
permitted to fly or hover with the aid of its own small propulsion motors. The satellite-killer
would use its heat-sensing mechanism to home in on the difference in temperature between
the metal satellite and surrounding space and then ram the targeted vehicle at about 17,500
miles per hour.
2. Washington Post, Oct. 5, 1977, § 1, at 2, col. 1. As mentioned, the Soviet weapon,
though similar to the United States weapon because it is non-nuclear, is different from the
United States weapon. It is an explosive device that flies within range of the targeted vehicle
and explodes. According to Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, the Soviets recently have
completed successful testing of the ASAT weapon and the Department of Defense has up-
graded the weapon to operational status. The Department presently is working to harden the
circuitry of its reconnaissance satellites in an effort to increase their survivability.
3. Robinson, Soviets Pushfor Beam Weapon, 106 AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH.
11, 16, May 2, 1977.
4. United States scientists have speculated that the technology required to produce
such a beam weapon includes: 1) explosive or pulsed power generation supplied by either
fission or fusion; 2) giant capacitors capable of storing extremely high levels of power for
fractions of a second; 3) electron injectors capable of generating high energy pulse streams of
electrons at high velocities; 4) collective accelerators to generate electron pulse streams or hot
gas plasma necessary to accelerate other subatomic particles at high velocities; 5) flux com-
pression to convert energy from explosive generation to energy sufficient to produce the elec-
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Apparently, utilization of the non-nuclear devices presently
under development in both the United States and the Soviet Union
will be limited to destruction or neutralization of both reconnais-
sance and communication satellites. The destructive potential and
operational utility of the directed-energy weapon, however, is not
nearly so limited. The device could function in two distinct envi-
ronments: it could be stationed on earth and directed toward outer
space,5 or placed somewhere in outer space, either in space itself or
on a celestial body or the moon, and directed toward the earth or
other objects similarly located in outer space.6 Moreover, such a
weapon could be designed to destroy satellites, to neutralize or in-
tercept intercontinental or submarine launched ballistic missiles,
and to attack earthly targets.
This article's objective is to examine the international legality
of these anti-satellite weapons in light of the Outer Space Treaty of
1967. 7 The discussion of the directed-energy weapon will not di-
rectly address the question of the legality of such a terrestrially-
based system. Nor will the legality of using a space-based directed-
energy weapon to attack targets other than satellites be specifically
considered. However, to the extent that such a space-based system
falls within the proscriptions of the Outer Space Treaty, it, too, is
prohibited.
I. OUTER SPACE TREATY OF 1967: AN OVERVIEW
The Outer Space Treaty, signed at Moscow, London, and
Washington on January 27, 1967,8 was the first multilateral conven-
tion to enumerate widely accepted guidelines designed to temper
the intensity of potential disputes certain to arise in future alloca-
tion of both the spatial and material resources of outer space. The
tron beam; 6) switching mechanisms necessary to store the energy from the generators in
large capacitors; and 7) development of pressurized lines needed to transfer the power pulses
from the generators to power stores. The lines must be cooled cryogenically. Scientists have
estimated that the typical energy levels required for use with a beam weapon are 1012 joules
per pulse, with the energy of a particle of the beam from I to 100 giga electron volts.
5. One use of directed-energy weapons would be to saturate the spatial windows
through which ICBM's or SLBM's penetrate enemy airspace in order to attack enemy
targets. Utilizing the atomically charged particles projected by such weapons, the incoming
warheads would be destroyed or neutralized.
6. Robinson, supra note 3, at 16.
7. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, done, Jan. 27, 1967, [1967] 3
U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter cited as Outer Space Treaty).
8. Id.
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treaty attempts to conserve, as well as extend, mutually held values9
through the promotion of three basic objectives. Each article of the
Treaty is subsumed under one of these three objectives.
The first and most fundamental objective of the Treaty is to
guarantee that outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, remains the heritage of all mankind. This objective is re-
flected in both general and specific provisions of the Treaty. The
opening provisions of the Treaty enunciate three general principles
governing the use and exploration of space. Article I requires that
all space activities be carried on for the benefit, and in the interest,
of all mankind. Consistent with the first article, article II prohibits
any nation from appropriating outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies. Article III, however, applies both interna-
tional law and the optimum order system of the United Nations
Charter to space activities.
The specific provisions that reflect the first objective of the
Treaty seek to distribute the benefits resulting from the use and ex-
ploration of space among the largest number of participants while
simultaneously providing a means for redressing exclusive use. For
example, articles X, XI, and XII, respectively, require that states
parties be given an opportunity to observe the flight of objects
launched into space; that the nature, conduct, location, and results
of space activity be disseminated to the public to the greatest extent
practicable; and that stations, installations, equipment, and space
vehicles be open to all parties on the basis of reciprocity. '0 On the
other hand, under article IX, any party planning to undertake an
activity in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bod-
ies, which gives it "reason to believe" the activity will cause "poten-
tially harmful interference" with the activity of any other party in
the peaceful use or exploration of space, is required to request "ap-
propriate" international consultation before proceeding." Simi-
9. The international decision-making process attempts to conserve, extend, and dis-
tribute universally shared values to the largest number of participants. See generally M.
McDOUGAL, et. al., STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER(1960). Such universally shared val-
ues include, interalia, power, wealth, respect, well-being, security, skill, enlightenment, recti-
tude (applied ethics), and affection. The Outer Space Treaty affects these values in two
distinct ways. First, it attempts to conserve these values, particularly well-being and security.
Second, it extends their applicability to the outer space environment. At least one factor
affecting adherence to the provisions of the Treaty is the extent to which the Treaty reflects
these universally shared values. It is unlikely that any international convention will prove
effective if it fails to conserve or, in fact, threatens such values.
10. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, arts. X, XI & XII.
II. Id. art. IX.
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larly, if the party planning to undertake the activity decides against
fulfilling the obligation imposed upon it to request consultation,
then any party with "reason to believe" the activity will cause "po-
tentially harmful interference" with activities in the peaceful use or
exploration of space may request such consultation. This provision
is particularly pertinent to the present discussion. To the extent that
deployment of an anti-satellite weapon creates the potential for
harmful interference with peaceful uses of space, such deployment
interferes with the inclusive uses of space promoted by the Treaty.
The deploying state may have an obligation to request consultation.
The second objective of the Treaty provides for cooperation
among, and liability of, the parties exploring space. Article V re-
quires that parties regard astronauts as envoys of mankind and
render them all needed assistance. ' 2 Article VI fixes the responsibil-
ity for space activities of a governmental or non-governmental en-
tity upon the adhering state,' 3 while article VII declares that
liability for damage caused by a space object to another party is to
be incurred by both the launching state and the state from which
the object was launched.' 4 For the purpose of tying these principles
together and guaranteeing that a launched object does not become
res nullius, article VIII was included to assure that the state of regis-
try retains jurisdiction over the object. 15
The third and final objective of the Treaty is to prevent the
arms race from spreading to outer space. This objective exemplifies
the widely shared values of security and well-being. The Limited
Test Ban Treaty of 196316 merely prohibited nuclear explosions in
outer space. It said nothing about various other military uses of
space. The following discussion is designed to treat the arms con-
trol provisions of the Outer Space Treaty in the context of the anti-
satellite weapon problem.
12. Id. art. V.
13. Id. art. Vi.
14. Id. art. VII.
15. Id. art. VIII.
16. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, done, Aug. 5, 1963, [1963] 2 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43
[hereinafter cited as Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963]. Art. 1 (1) reads:
Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to
carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any
place under its jurisdiction or control:
(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or underwater,
including territorial waters or high seas .. .;
Vol. 8
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II. ARTICLE IV, PARAGRAPH 1: PARTIAL DISARMAMENT
The first paragraph of article IV reads as follows:
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit
around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any
kind of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on
celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any
other manner.1
7
The objective of the opening paragraph is to eliminate nuclear and
other weapons of mass destruction from outer space and celestial
bodies. It does not proscribe conventional non-nuclear devices. Be-
cause only nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction have
been prohibited expressly by the terms of paragraph 1, it has been
termed a clause of partial disarmament."8 As such, it does not affect
deployment of non-nuclear anti-satellite weapons presently under
development in both the United States and Soviet Union. In light
of the fact that this section of the article intends to test the legality
of anti-satellite weapons against the restrictions of paragraph 1, and
because paragraph 1 does not proscribe deployment of non-nuclear
weapons, the present discussion shall focus upon the legality of the
directed-energy anti-satellite weapon. The question of whether a
directed-energy weapon is, in fact, a nuclear or other weapon of
mass destruction will be addressed later. To the extent such a
weapon falls into the nuclear or mass destruction category, it is cov-
ered by the proscriptions of article IV, paragraph I.'
The inclusions and omissions under article IV, paragraph 1,
present several questions that should be examined before any defin-
itive answer can be posited as to whether deployment of an outer
space directed-energy weapon would violate article IV. For exam-
ple, although placing nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruc-
tion in orbit around the earth is expressly prohibited, is it
permissible to place a directed-energy weapon in orbit around the
moon or other celestial bodies, if such a weapon is categorized as a
nuclear weapon or a weapon of mass destruction? Since the lan-
guage of the first paragraph appears to prohibit installation only on
celestial bodies, may a directed-energy weapon legally be installed
on the moon? Suppose a directed-energy weapon is pursuing a spa-
17. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. IV, para. I (emphasis added). Although the
paragraphs within the articles to this Treaty are not numbered, they will be numbered herein
for purposes of clarity and precision.
18. Markoff, Disarmament and "Peaceful Purposes" Provision in the 1967 Outer Space
Treaty, 4 J. SPACE L. 3, 4 (1976).
19. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. IV, para. 1.
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tial course and would complete one orbit of the earth if unimpeded.
Is the weapon within the purview of paragraph 1 if it fails, either
adventitiously or by design, to complete the orbit? Does the pro-
scription of orbiting weapons embrace a synchronous directed-en-
ergy weapon? Finally, is a directed-energy weapon a nuclear
weapon, or a weapon of mass destruction within the meaning of
either term?
The fact that there are few actual interpretive documents on
article IV2" similar to those that domestic lawyers analyze when
attempting to construe municipal legislation, poses a significant
problem. Thus, the task of construing article IV has been left to
international lawyers using, in good faith, generally accepted prin-.
ciples of construction. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties,2' though not yet in force, states the most univer-
sally accepted rule of construction and composes a synthesis of the
interpretive methodology applied throughout this article. Article 31
states that:
1. A treaty will be interpreted in good faith in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in light of its object andpurpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty
shall comprise, in addition to the text . ., its preamble and
annexes ....
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties . . . ; (b)
any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties . . . ;22
It is clear from the above article that when interpreting any treaty
provision, that provision should be construed within the context of
the total treaty. The context includes the preamble as well as the
preceding and subsequent provisions. Moreover, the construction
should be designed to effectuate the object and purpose of the
drafters.
20. While no actual reports exist as to the precise meaning of each provision, details of
the negotiations in the Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peace-
ful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) do exist. See U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/C.2/SR.63, particu-
larly SR.66 at 6 (July 25, 1966).
21. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, May 22, 1969, reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875, 885
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention].
22. Id (emphasis added).
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A. Is it Permissible to Place a Directed-Energy Weapon in Orbit
Around the Moon or Other Celestial Bodies?
Assuming that a directed-energy weapon is a nuclear weapon
or a weapon of mass destruction, a first reading of article IV, para-
graph 1 appears only to prohibit the placement of such weapons in
orbit around the earth. In fact, because reference to the moon is
conspicuously absent, an argument can be posited for the proposi-
tion that celestial-orbiting as well as moon-orbiting directed-energy
weapons are permissible. That construction, however, does not
withstand scrutiny because paragraph 1 prohibits the orbiting of
nuclear or comparable earth-orbiting weapons, the installation of
such on celestial bodies, and, also, the stationing of Such weapons
in outer space in "any other manner."23 The latter provision has
been construed to mean deployment around the moon or any celes-
tial body.24 In fact, that is the construction accepted by the United
States.25 Thus, paragraph 1 not only expressly proscribes earth-
orbiting weapons, but also, within the definition of "station," those
weapons designed to orbit the moon or any other celestial body. 6
B. Can a Directed-Energy Weapon be Installed on the Moon
Without Violating Article IV?
Though it would be a clear violation to install a directed-en-
ergy weapon on a celestial body, the language of the Treaty fails to
clarify whether the moon is a celestial body. Does paragraph 1 pro-
hibit a party from orbiting a directed-energy weapon around the
moon by preventing such from being stationed in outer space, yet
permit the lunar installation of a directed-energy weapon? This is a
significant question because it is entirely conceivable that some na-
tion may attempt to install such a weapon on the moon and then
proceed to use it against satellites, space vehicles located in outer
space, or earth based targets.
Some have suggested that the moon was intentionally excluded
23. Outer Space Treaty, 'supra note 7, art. IV, para. 1.
24. U.N. Doc. A/7221 (1968); A/Bur./Sr.175, at 3 (1968).
25. Hearings Before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm. on Executive D, 90th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 8 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Outer Space Hearings]. United Nations Ambassador
Arthur Goldberg responded negatively during the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
hearings when asked whether article IV, para. I permitted orbiting of the moon.
26. Nor does it matter that the ultimate target is on the earth, another celestial body, or
in outer space proper.
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
from the proscription.27 Yet, not all agree, 28 and the better view
appears to be that installation, whether on a celestial body apart
from the moon, or on the moon itself, is prohibited. The moon is a
celestial body within the "ordinary meaning" of that term. When
the Treaty is construed in context, so that each article is rendered
consistent with the preceding and subsequent articles,29 installation
on the moon is contrary to the avowed declaration of article I, para-
graph 1, which states that the "use of outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies shall be carried out for the benefit
and in the interest of all countries .. ..*"' Moreover, the peaceful
purposes clause of article IV, paragraph 2,31 demilitarizes the moon
and other celestial bodies. This construction receives additional
credence from the fact that any other interpretation would violate
the preambular language of the Outer Space Treaty32 and General
Assembly Resolution 1884, 3  recalled by the architects of the
27. N. MATTE, AEROSPACE LAW 299 (1969). He states:
[in] accordance with the siructo sensu interpretation of the law of treaties, the fact
that the expression 'the moon and other celestial bodies' is used at the beginning of
the secondparagraph of the same article . . . .might mean that the expression
'celestial bodies' when used by itself should be interpreted as excluding the moon.
The result of such an interpretation would mean that the installation of nuclear
weapons on the moon would be permissible (emphasis added).
28. Wehringer, The Treaty on Outer Space, 54 A.B.A. J. 586, 587 (1968).
29. There are two basic schools of thought on the construction of treaties: 1) the "plain
meaning" school; and 2) the "general purpose" school. The former uses the notion of univo-
calism as its primary operable premise. This means that a term has one meaning, the mean-
ing is identifiable and the specific meaning controls. The better method of construction is the
latter. It seeks to effectuate the intentions of the drafters by looking at the provision in the
context of the total treaty. For a complete exposition of the latter approach see Vienna Con-
vention, art. 31, supra note 21, at 293. See also Judge Anzilotti's dissenting opinion in the
case of Interpretation of the 1919 Convention Concerning Employment of Women During the
Night, [19321 P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 50; M. HUDSON, 3 WORLD COURTS REPORTS 99, 112-16
(1932). McDougal & Gardner, The Veto and the Charter. An Interpretation for Survival, 60
YALE L.J. 258-92 (1951) also adopts the general purpose approach with some modifications.
For an introduction to the plain meaning approach see Gross, Voting in the Security Council,
60 YALE L.J. 209 (1951). Although the article deals with the interpretation of article 27 (3) of
the United Nations Charter and the question of the effect of absence and abstention in the
Security Council voting process, it provides an adequate introduction to the plain meaning
rule.
30. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. I.
31. Regarding the arguments mustered to prove the unlawfulness of installing nuclear
weapons on the moon, critics may claim that the only activities actually considered non-
peaceful by article IV, para. 2 are those enumerated in the second sentence of the second
paragraph. Moreover, although the installation of nuclear weapons appears to violate the
"installation" prohibition, the entire second sentence is limited only to celestial bodies and
states nothing about the moon.
32. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, at 2411. The preamble states in part:
Believing that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried on for the
benefit of all peoples. . . (emphasis added).
Id.
33. GAOR Res. 1884, U.N. Doc. A/C.I/L.34 A/Res./1884 (1963), states in its opening
stanza:
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Treaty and expressly designed to curb the spread of the arms race
to outer space. Numerous positions on the legality of installing nu-
clear or other analogous weapons on the moon have been voiced.
The better view, however, appears to find such installations viola-
tive because article IV, paragraph 1, read in conjunction with arti-
cle I, paragraph 1, requires that the moon be used for the benefit of
all mankind.34 This cannot be accomplished if used by a single na-
tion for its own military purposes. Article IV, paragraph 2 also re-
quires that the moon and other celestial bodies be used for peaceful
purposes. 35 Moreover, the preamble of the Outer Space Treaty and
General Assembly Resolution 1884 express complimentary inten-
tions.
C Must a Directed-Energy Space Weapon Complete One Full
Orbit Before Coming Within the Prohibitions of the
Treaty?- What f the Weapon is Synchronous?
The legality of placing conventional weapons in outer space
remains unresolved when paragraphs 1 and 2 of article IV are read
in conjunction, yet, an analysis of that subject must await the next
section of this article.36 On the other hand, it is essential that discus-
Determined to take steps to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space
Note that on October 16, 1963, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson remarked to the United Na-
tions Political and Security Committee:
[T]his resolution calls for abstention. It would represent international recognition
that the arms race in outer space must not be extended into this new environment,
that while we are seeking ways of limiting and reducing existing armaments, we
undertake to refrain from developing a new potential in the armaments field. Cer-
tainly, it would seem easier not to arm an environment that has never been armed
than to agree to disarm areas which have been armed (emphasis added).
49 DEP'T STATE BULL. 753 (1963).
In light of the fact the preamble of the Outer Space Treaty recalls General Assembly
Resolution 1884, the draftsmen probably were looking to effectuate the precatory language
found in that resolution as cited above.
34. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. IV, para. I & art. I, para. 1.
35. Id. art. IV, para. 2.
36. N. MATTE, supra note 27, at 240. As stated previously, paragraph I prohibits the
deployment of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. It is not a complete
disarmament clause. Deployment of conventional weapons is not considered violative of ar-
ticle IV, para. 1. Alternative arguments can be posited in favor of outlawing even conven-
tional weapons. These, however, are not based upon any reading of article IV, para. 1, but
rather upon the peaceful purposes clause of article IV, para. 2, which is extended tenuously
to outer space when construed in conjunction with the clause in article I, para. I declaring
that outer space is to be used for the "benefit and in the interest of all countries." As will be
discussed infra, all the preparatory work indicates that the intention of the drafters was not
to include outer space proper within the protection of the peaceful purposes clause. Thus,
prohibition of conventional weapons must spring, if at all, from some provision other than
article IV, para. 2. See text accompanying notes 46-89 infra.
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sion ensue as to whether or not it is necessary for a directed-energy
weapon to complete one full orbit before it comes within the ambit
of the Convention's proscription regarding orbiting weapons. Does
article IV, paragraph 1 prohibit a nation from placing in orbit a
directed-energy, or other similarly destructive weapon, that merely
embarks on a partial orbit; one that, if not discontinued, would be
at an altitude and speed sufficient to complete a full orbit?37 Fur-
thermore, to what extent would a synchronous vehicle, 38 equipped
with a prohibited weapon, come within the restrictions of article IV,
paragraph 1?
Some have contended that any weapon which fails to complete
one orbit escapes the language of the Treaty.39 Opponents of such
an interpretation suggest that there is nothing in article IV, para-
graph 1 requiring that the vehicle complete an orbit before being
affected by the prohibitions of the agreement. They suggest that,
because the term orbit is not defined by the Treaty, other sources
should be anlayzed to determine the definition. One such source is
the definition proposed by the National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration describing orbit as the path followed by a body under
gravitational or other forces. This is a directional or locational defi-
nition and not one that would require the completion of one orbit
before the directed-energy weapon would be considered to be in
orbit.' The real concern, however, should not be whether the
weapon has completed or must complete one revolution of the
37. This was an acute concern of the United States in November of 1968, immediately
prior to the signing of the Outer Space Treaty. Secretary of Defense McNamara disclosed
that the Soviets were developing a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) capable
of being launched into outer space, pursuing a partial orbit and then, periodically, slowing to
discharge nuclear warheads toward earthly targets. Shortly thereafter, the Director of the
Defense Department's Research and Engineering Office stated that the United States was in
the process of developing its own FOBS termed the Space Bus. See N. MATTE, supra note
27, at 240. Views on the international legality of FOBS were conflicting. When questioned by
Congress as to whether the system violated article IV, para. 1, McNamara responded in the
negative. He pointed out that "the so called FOBS would not accomplish one full orbit...
and was, like ballistic missiles that go through space in their trajectories, not covered by the
Treaty and thus no more than the ICBM" (emphasis added). See N. MATTE, supra note 27,
at 240.
38. A synchronous vehicle is one that, after being placed in space, does not circle the
earth at a speed faster than the earth rotates on its axis. Rather, a synchronous satellite is
located in space at some point above the earth traveling in an orbit at the same speed as the
earth. Therefore, it is constantly above that same spot on the earth.
39. Markoff, supra note 18, at 4. See also Stein, Legal Restraints in Modern Arms Con-
itrol4greements, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 255, 263 (1972).
40. Comment, The Treaty On Outer Space. An Evaluation ofthe Arms Control Provi-
sions, 7 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 259, 274 (1968).
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earth before triggering the proscriptions of paragraph 1. The
United States and Soviet Union had no intention of restricting the
use of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) through the
Outer Space Treaty. The real issue, therefore, should be the length
of time the weapon spends in space. Even if it does not complete
one orbit, but is positioned in outer space, it is outlawed by the
clause preventing the stationing of nuclear or comparable weapons
in outer space in "any manner". Thus, one should actually look for
the existence or absence of a time analogy between ICBMs and
directed-energy weapons. If the length of time spent is comparable
to that of an ICBM, then the use may be permissible. Whether the
weapon is synchronous does not matter because stationing is re-
lated to time rather than location. The drafters intended to leave
ICBMs untouched, while prohibiting the parties from stationing or
orbiting nuclear and other analogous weapons.
D. Is a Directed-Energy Weapon a Nuclear Weapon or Other
Weapon of Mass Destruction?
Paragraph 1 of article IV prohibits deployment in space of
both nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. 4'
The generally accepted position is that a weapon of mass destruc-
tion is not a typical non-nuclear device.42 Rather, it is a bacteriolog-
ical, chemical, or other weapon capable of producing damage
equivalent to a nuclear device.43 When one considers the opera-
tional features of a directed-energy weapon, there is little question
that it is covered by either proscription. The previous discussion
assumes that a directed-energy weapon is a nuclear weapon or
weapon of mass destruction. The following discussion merely sub-
stantiates that assumption.
41. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. IV, para. 1.
42. See note 40 supra, at 275.
43. Outer Space Hearings, supra note 25, at 23. Ambassador Goldberg stated that mass
destruction weapons included, inter alia, "any type of weapon which could lead to the same
type of catastrophe that a nuclear weapon could lead to . . . . It does not refer to any
conventional weapon." If one closely examines Goldberg's statement, there is nothing en-
demic to conventional weapons that prohibits a super-powerful conventional weapon from
being considered a weapon of mass destruction. Such a conclusion is supported by the
United Nations. For example, the Commission for Conventional Armaments, established by
the Security Council, adopted a resolution on Aug. 12, 1948, defining weapons of mass de-
struction to include lethal chemical and biological weapons developed in the future which
have "characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other
weapons mentioned above." Resolution Adopted by the Commission for Conventional
Armaments, 3 U.N. SCOR 2, U.N. Doc. S/C.3/32 (1948).
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Although a directed-energy weapon differs from a typical nu-
clear bomb, which centers its destructive force at the point of deto-
nation, it is, nevertheless, precisely the type of weapon that
paragraph 1 contemplates. A nuclear weapon utilizes, for destruc-
tive purposes, energy forces released through the splitting44 or
union45 of atoms. The basic atomic physics underlying a directed-
energy weapon is the projection of destructive particles that have
been atomically charged through the fission or fusion processes.
The fact that resultant damage may not be as catastrophic as that
caused by a larger typical nuclear device is not determinative. Few
would seriously contend that so-called "mini-nukes" are not nu-
clear weapons and a directed-energy weapon is designed to simi-
larly limit the damage inflicted.4 6 Thus, as with any nuclear
weapon, a directed-energy weapon is incapable of escaping the
mandates of the Treaty.
Despite the apertures of article IV, paragraph 1, proper con-
struction renders it a useful device for instructing such nations as
the Soviet Union, which is contemplating the placement of di-
rected-energy weapons in outer space, that such would violate ac-
cepted international principles designed to seek the widest
distribution of shared values. Though the express language ap-
pears to prohibit only earth orbiting weapons, directed-energy
weapons are precluded from orbiting the moon or any other celes-
tial body by the clause that prohibits the stationing of such weapons
in outer space. Additionally, any attempted lunar installation of a
directed-energy weapon would run afoul of the provision that pro-
hibits the installation of such devices on celestial bodies, because
the moon is a celestial body. Moreover, the parties have agreed to
use "outer space, including the moon," for the benefit of all coun-
tries. Such a benefit would not occur if one nation used it for its
own military objectives. A directed-energy weapon designed not to
complete one full orbit, or one designed to be synchronous, cannot
escape the language of paragraph 1. The determinative factor is the
length of time the vehicle spends in outer space. The completion of
44. Referred to as fission.
45. Referred to as fusion.
46. Though it is conceivable that future technological advances may enhance substan-
tially the destructive capability of directed-energy weapons, present information indicates
that their utility and destructive capability are limited. Apparently, directed-energy weapons
will be used against satellites and warheads. However, the effect of destroying an incoming
warhead in the airspace above a terrestrial target may be significant.
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one full orbit, or continuous spatial location above one spot on the
earth, does not alter the situation.
III. ARTICLE IV, PARAGRAPH 1: "PEACEFUL PURPOSES"
As previously discussed, article IV, paragraph I prohibits the
deployment of nuclear and other analogous weapons in outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. The extent to
which the Treaty limits non-nuclear anti-satellite weapons rests in
part upon the peaceful purposes clause of article IV, paragraph 2.
Because the United States and the Soviet Union are endeavoring to
develop conventional non-nuclear anti-satellite weapons, it is es-
sential to explore the limitations that the peaceful purposes clause
places upon the deployment of such weapons.
Article IV, paragraph 2 reaches beyond a mere prohibition of
nuclear and other analogous weapons towards complete demilitari-
zation.47 The paragraph reflects a compromise between disparate
Soviet" and United States49 draft proposals. It reads:
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all State
Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peacefulpurposes. The estab-
lishment of military bases, installations and fortfcations, the
testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military ma-
neuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of mili-
tary personnel for scientic or for any other peacefulpurposes
shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility nec-
essary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial
bodies shall not be prohibited.5 °
47. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. IV, para. 2.
48. See STAFF REPORT, COMM. ON AERONAUTICAL & SPACE SCIENCES, 89TH CONG.,
2D SESS., SPACE TREATY PROPOSALS BY THE UNITED STATES AND U.S.S.R. (Comm. Print
1966) [hereinafter cited as Space Treaty Report]. The Soviet draft article IV proposed:
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes
by all Parties to the Treaty. The establishment of military bases and installations,
the testing of weapons and conduct of military manoeuvers on celestial bodies shall
be forbidden.
Id. at 20.
49. See id. at 20 for the United States proposals. Article 9 states:
Celestial bodies shall be used for peaceful purposes only. All States undertake to
refrain from conducting on celestial bodies any activities such as the establishment
of military fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, or the testing of
any type of weapons. The use of military personnel, facilities or equipment for
scientifc research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited.
Id. The final draft incorporated both the Soviet and United States proposals.
50. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. IV, para. 2 (emphasis added). While the
Soviet proposal applied to both the moon and other celestial bodies, the United States draft
provision covered celestial bodies alone. In addition, the United States draft prohibited mili-
taryforqfications, maneuvers, and testing, while the Soviet draft prohibited military bases and
1978
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Close analysis of the language used in the second paragraph of
article IV reveals almost as many ambiguities as the first paragraph
of article IV.5 The following are the specific issues most deserving
of discussion. First, does the term "peaceful purposes" mean that
space may be used only for non-military, or nonaggressive pur-
poses? Non-nuclear anti-satellite weapons are not within the
prohibitions of the first paragraph. Therefore, only a non-military
definition will prohibit their deployment. Secondly, although the
express language of the peaceful purposes clause applies only to the
the moon and other celestial bodies, does the failure to mention
outer space mean that outer space may be used for non-peaceful
purposes so long as the prohibitions of article IV, paragraph 1 and
other relevant international principles are not transgressed? There
are other issues of interest based upon a thorough exploration of
article IV, paragraph 2; yet, it is beyond the scope of this article to
explore all the vagaries of the Treaty.52
While differences of opinion exist as to the meaning of the
term peaceful purposes, 53 apparently since 1957 the major powers
installations, maneuvers, and testing. Finally, article 9 of the draft submitted by the United
States contained provision for the use of military personnel, facilities, and equipment for
scientific or other peaceful purposes. The Soviet draft permitted no such use. The Soviet
Union's request to insert the term "installation" between bases and fortjfications was incor-
porated. The Soviet's quidpro quo was acquiescence to the United States request that two
additional sentences be included reflecting the fact that military personnel and equipment
would be permitted to make peaceful use of the moon and other celestial bodies.
51. See generally Dembling & Arons, The Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty, 33 J.
AIR L. & CoM. 419 (1967).
52. Two important questions remain. Since no mention is made of the moon or outer
space in the sentence prohibiting bases, installations, fortifications, maneuvers, and weapons
testing, can these facilities and activities be conducted in such places? The other question is
whether reconnaissance from the moon and outer space is permissible? Though other issues
remain, these are the most significant.
53. As noted, basic views on the definition of "peaceful purposes" are that it means
either non-military or nonaggressive. Professor Gorove, in his commentary Some Thoughts
on Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTEENTH COLLOQUIUM
ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 79 (1971) suggests that
it would appear much more productive to abandon the artificial. . . distinction[s]
. . . and focus on the prohibition or permission of the particular activity instead.
Certain activities from the viewpoint of national security may not be as critical or
significant as others (emphasis added).
Apparently, Gorove is of the opinion that parties should be less concerned about defining
peaceful purposes in isolation, and should examine the extent of intrusion by particular ac-
tivities on a case by case basis. While this surely would improve the accuracy of the defini-
tion in application, it fails to provide the needed predictability to determine whether the
particular contemplated conduct is permissible. In this sense, acting nations are given no
clear guidelines to follow.
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have endeavored to exclude all other uses of outer space.54 Two
views have emerged regarding the meaning of peaceful purposes.
The legality of non-nuclear anti-satellite weapons will be examined
in light of both of these views. One school of thought contends that
" 'peaceful' is not the opposite of 'military' but is meant as 'non-
aggressive' only."55 Therefore, military activities of a nonaggressive
character are permissible. The other view suggests that when the
peaceful purposes clause is construed in conjunction with article I,
paragraph 1, which calls for the use of the celestial environment for
the benefit and in the interest of all countries, peaceful must mean
non-military.5 6 Thus, any military activity, aggressive or not, is pro-
scribed. Actually, the language of article IV, paragraph 2 is insuffi-
cient to suggest a definition. The paragraph merely reads that the
"moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties
to the Treaty exclusively for peacefupurposes."5 Because there is a
dearth of actual interpretive documentation, one must rely upon
the accepted principles of construction recounted earlier when at-
tempting to determine the line of reasoning that most accurately
reflects the intention of the drafters.
Initially, it should be noted that there are three distinctly dif-
ferent environments to which the peaceful purposes clause may
have applicability: the moon, celestial bodies, and outer space. The
analysis of article IV, paragraph 2 infra includes only the moon and
other celestial bodies because the first sentence of the second para-
graph, by its express terms, covers only those two realms. Differ-
ences of opinion regarding the application of the peaceful purposes
clause to the moon and celestial bodies do not necessarily exist
when applying the clause to outer space.5" In fact, the United States
54. See Soraghan, Reconnaissance Satellites.- Legal Characterization and Possible Utili-
zation for Peacekeeping, 13 MCGILL L.J. 458 (1967). The commentator notes:
In January, 1957, the United States urged in the United Nations that studies in
disarmament include space activities, and in August of that year the United States
was joined by Canada, France and Great Britian in proposing United Nations in-
spection of spacecraft to insure that they serve peaceful purposes only.
Id. at 460. Proposals were made in domestic as well as international fora. In 1958, the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) suggested, and Congress confirmed in
Act of July 29, 1958, Pub. L. 85-568, § 102(a), 72 Stat. 426, that space be used for peaceful
purposes. That same year the Soviets also called upon the United Nations to use space for
peaceful purposes. See U.N. Doc. A/3818 (1958).
55. Markoff, supra note 18, at 6.
56. Id. at 7.
57. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art IV, para. 2 (emphasis added).
58. Both the United States and the Soviet Union agree on the fact that the use of outer
space is limited by a nonaggressive rather than a non-military doctrine. Thus, any activity
that is military, but nonaggressive, is permissible. The nonaggressive doctrine apparently
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and the Soviet Union hold different positions as to the meaning of
the clause when applied to the moon and other celestial bodies; yet,
both agree the clause has no applicability to outer space.
A. Does the "'Peaceful Purposes" Clause Permit Nonaggressive
Activity or Only Non-Military Activity to be Conducted
on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies?
As stated previously, the express terms of the peaceful pur-
poses clause cover only the moon and celestial bodies. Addition-
ally, article IV, paragraph 1 prohibits lunar or celestial deployment
of nuclear and other analogous weapons. Therefore, if lunar or ce-
lestial deployment of any conventional non-nuclear weapon is to be
prohibited, the prohibition must arise from a non-military defini-
tion of peaceful purposes because article IV, paragraph 1 is not so
comprehensive.
Neither of the non-nuclear ant-satelte weapons discussed
above are designed to be deployed on the moon or other celestial
bodies. Consequently, they will not be affected directly by any ap-
plication of the peaceful purposes clause to those two environ-
ments. Nevertheless, it is essential to develop a functional definition
for the clause. Such a definition will assist in determining the legal-
ity of any directed-energy weapon installed on the moon or other
celestial body and held to be unaffected by article IV, paragraph 1.
Moreover, the definition may also prove useful in determining the
legality of some future lunar or celestial deployment of other non-
nuclear anti-satellite weapons.
1. Nonaggressive. As stated above, one group of jurists con-
tends that the term peaceful purposes is most accurately defined as
meaning nonaggressive5 9 This is basically the view held by the
arises from the fact that the peaceful purposes clause does not expressly apply to outer space
proper and, therefore, only the United Nations Charter and international law apply. Both
only prohibit aggressive activity.
59. See generaly Beresford, Surveillance Aircraft and Satellites. A Problem of Interna-
tional Law, 27 J. AiR L. & COM. 107 (1960). One commentator suggests that "[i]t is the
position of the United States . . .that the term 'peaceful', as applied to space activities, is
used in opposition [to the term] 'aggressive', not [the term]. . . 'military'." Soraghan, supra
note 54, at 466. The Soviets basically agree with this definition as it is applied to outer space.
When it comes to application to the moon and other celestial bodies, however, the Soviets
take a view contrary to that of the United States. Specifically, the Soviets insist that peaceful
purposes means non-military and that it applies to the moon and celestial bodies exclusively.
Outer space is not covered by the peaceful purposes clause and, therefore, only article III
limits the nature of the activity that may be pursued in outer space proper.
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United States and most Western powers.6 ° Such a construction is
premised upon several bases. The most fundamental basis is that, in
view of the admonition of article III of the Treaty, to apply the
principles of the United Nations Charter and international law to
outer space, the moon, and other celestial bodies, the drafters could
not have intended to prohibit nonaggressive military uses6' because
both sources permit nonaggressive military activity. In addition,
proponents of the nonaggressive definition muster support from the
fact that, generally, when the Treaty intends to proscribe certain
activities, it explicitly enumerates them. For instance, one commen-
tator has stated that:
It should be noted that when an express prohibition is intended,
the Treaty clearly does so, such as its prohibition against "the
testing of any types of weapons" in outer space in Article IV. No
such similar prohibition is recited against military activities per
se. The "Treaty must be read as a whole. . . . Military person-
nel expressly are authorized" for scientific research or for any
other "peaceful purposes." How can it now any longer be said in
the light of this language, that peaceful purposes means "non-
military?" It can only mean "non-aggressive."62
It matters little under such an interpretation that military personnel
or equipment are used; the nonaggressive definition of peaceful
purposes is not automatically violated.63 Only aggressive activity
that constitutes "an attack upon, or stress against, the territorial in-
tegrity and independence of another [s]tate . . .,6 violates the
clause.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that several major powers
accept the proposition that peaceful purposes, as applied to the
moon and other celestial bodies, restricts only aggressive military
activity. One reason for this construction is that it appears sound
when article IV, paragraph 2 and article III, making the United
60. See Vlasic, The Space Treaty.'A preliminary Evaluation, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 507, 514
(1967).
61. Dembling & Arons, supra note 51, at 434. Professor Dembling suggests:
In the interim, one might conclude that any military use of outer space must be
restricted to nonaggressive purposes in view of Article III, which makes applicable
international law including the Charter of the United Nations.
See also Stein, supra note 39, at 262-63.
62. Finch, Outer Spacefor "Peaceful Purposes" 54 A.B.A.J. 365, 366 (1968) (emphasis
added).
63. See Galloway, Interpreting the Treaty on Outer Space, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
TENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 143, 145 (1967).
64. Meyer, Interpretation 0fthe Term "Peaceful" in the Light ofthe Space Treaty, PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 27 (1968).
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Nations Charter and international law applicable to the moon and
other celestial bodies, are read in conjunction. The Treaty generally
enumerates the activities it desires to prohibit, and because it fails
to strike at all military activity and, in fact, permits the use of mili-
tary personnel and equipment in certain cases, any suggestion that
peaceful purposes means non-military may be incorrect. However,
one distinction seems to be overlooked by the proponents of the
nonaggressive definition. The mere fact that military personnel are
used for scientific and exploratory research does not necessarily im-
ply that nonaggressive military activity can be undertaken. The fact
that the use of military personnel and equipment is permitted only
reflects upon the nature of the characters and not upon the purpose
of the undertaking.65
2. Non-Military. Even those who suggest that peaceful pur-
poses means "non-military" acknowledge the permissibility of us-
ing military personnel and equipment to carry out scientific or
other peaceful tasks.6 6 Nevertheless, they deny that anyone, civilian
or military, can undertake a particular activity for an avowed mili-
tary objective. Those adhering to the non-military position base
their interpretation on several foundations, the most important of
which is constructional. They say the Treaty must be read as a unit;
no one article or clause should be removed and examined in vacuo,
but should be viewed in light of the preceding and subsequent arti-
cles. This is consistent with article 31 of the Vienna Convention 67
and seems to require that peaceful purposes be defined with refer-
ence to article I, paragraph 1.68
Article I, paragraph 1 requires that every celestial activity be
carried out for the benefit, and in the interest, of all mankind. It has
been said that:
65. See Markov, The Juridical Meaning of the Term "Peaceful" in the 1967 Space
Treaty, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 30
(1968). The commentator states:
[T]he basic criterion for "peaceful"... is not the civil or military status of the crew
or of the installations on board a space engine, but the realpurpose of a given space
activity. Its goals are to be revealed given the specific obfect of the mission as well
as by the resulting records (emphasis added).
Id. at 34.
66. See Markov, Against the So-Called "Broader" Interpretation of the Term "Peaceful"
in International Space Law, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF
OUTER SPACE 73, 75 (1968).
67. Vienna Convention, supra note 21, art. 31, at 293.
68. See Markoff, supra note 18, at 7.
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Since Article I, paragraph 1 expressly recognizes that exploration
and use of [the moon and other celestial bodies] should be car-
red out for the benefit and in the interest of all states. . . , it is
doubtless that this disposition shuts out automatically from the
field of the lawful span of activities all kinds of military actions
without exception. This is because no military activity can nowa-
days be envisaged as being beneficial to all mankind and being
carried out in the interest of all countries of the world.69
The advocates of the non-military interpretation purport to
deal with the joint construction of articles I and III as follows. De-
spite the apparent inconsistency of articles I and III, they say article
I, paragraph 1 should not be overlooked when attempting to define
peaceful purposes. As one commentator has stated, article I, para-
graph 1
provides the evidence that all military actions, even the non-ag-
gressive, ought to be automatically excluded from the field of
LAWFUL activities in outer space, since all military activities
without exception, even the "non-aggressive" ones, may serve in
present time, the interest of one state, or a group of states
only-and NEVER of all the States as provided by the quoted
text of the 1967 Treaty.7°
If the two articles are construed together to render the most consis-
tent construction, the "application of the obligations arising under
the [United Nations] Charter to space activities . . . involves the
duty to maintain peace. . . in outer space.7 1 Military activities are
inconsistent with such an admonition. Some commentators have
minimized the effect that the application of the Charter to space
activities has had upon article I and article IV, paragraph 2. Stating
that article III was included merely to prevent disputes as to which
portions of the Charter would be applicable to outer space, some
advocates of the non-military definition suggest that "the provi-
sions of the Charter cannot find application in the Treaty and the
69. Markov, supra note 65, at 31 (emphasis added). See also Markoff, supra note 18, at
7, 21. Zhukov, On the Question of Interpretation ofthe Term "Peaceful Uses of Outer Space"
Contained in the Space Treaty, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW
OF OUTER SPACE 36, 38 (1968). The Russian view is that "any military activity on the moon
and other celestial bodies shall be forbidden." Thus, peaceful purposes is defined as non-
military.
70. Markov, supra note 65, at 77 (emphasis added). The non-military definition is also
the definition suggested by the former Chairman of the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS.
M. LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 106 (1972).
71. GAL, The Peaceful Uses of Outer Space-After the Space Treaty, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE TENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 129, 134 (1967).
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intention has been to disassociate the Charter from the Treaty. '7 2
Still other commenators suggest that article I, paragraph 1 estab-
fishes "a newly created general international law rule of higher
rank . .. ."'
3. Analysis of the Positions. The touchstones of the peaceful
purposes clause were the Antarctica Treaty of 1959,14 and the
Charter of the International Atomic Energy Agency drafted in
1956." 5 Both of these documents utilize the term "peaceful" to
mean non-military.7 6 Considering article I, paragraph 1, the previ-
ous international conventions using the peaceful purposes clause,
and the broad, general language in article III about the applicabil-
ity of the United Nations Charter and international law to outer
space, the most convincing argument favors the non-military defi-
nition of peaceful purposes. Moreover, such a definition promotes
the inclusive more than the exclusive uses of space and, in that
sense, is consistent with the basic objectives advanced by the
Treaty.
Since peaceful purposes means non-military, even nonaggres-
sive activity with a military objective is prohibited. This does not
exclude scientific or other peaceful activity conducted by military
personnel. Article IV, paragraph 1 prohibits the installation of di-
rected-energy weapons on the moon and celestial bodies, and the
peaceful purposes clause of the second paragraph prevents circum-
vention of the proscription of nuclear weapons by claims that di-
rected-energy weapons are non-nuclear. Thus, both paragraphs of
article IV affect the installation of directed-energy weapons on the
moon and celestial bodies.
The United States position is that the treaty permits military
activity so long as it is nonaggressive. On the other hand, the Soviet
72. N. MATrE, supra note 27, at 282.
73. Markov, supra note 65, at 32.
74. The Antarctic Treaty, entered into force June 23, 1961, [1961] U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S.
No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71. Article I reads:
1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be prohibited,
inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of mili-
tary bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as
the testing of any type of weapons.
2. The present Treaty shall not prevent the use of military personnel or equipment
for scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose (emphasis added).
On Antarctica generally, see Sullivan, ntarctica in a Two-Power World, 36 FOREIGN AFF.
154 (1957); Daniel, Conflict of Sovereignties in theAntarctica, 3 Y.B. WORLD AFF. 241 (1949);
Hayton, The "American"Antarctic, 50 AM. J. INT'L LAW 583 (1956).
75. Done, Oct. 26, 1956, 11957] U.S.T. 1093, T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 3.
76. Gil, supra note 71, at 135.
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Union subscribes to the view that, while article IV, paragraph 1
calls for partial disarmament of outer space, article IV, paragraph 2
mandates complete demilitarization of the moon and other celestial
bodies." Assuming that directed-energy weapons are perceived as
not within the proscription of article IV, paragraph 1, the Soviet
view would still find a violation of article IV, paragraph 2 if di-
rected-energy weapons were installed on the moon and other celes-
tial bodies. This conclusion appears to be harmonious with the
most accurate construction of the peaceful purposes clause and
seeks the widest distribution of the values extended and conserved
through the basic objectives of the Treaty.
B. Is Outer Space Covered by the 'Peaceful Purposes" Clause or
any Other Similarly Restrictive Provision?
As already discussed, article IV, paragraph 1 prohibits nuclear
weapons or weapons of mass destruction from being stationed in
outer space in any manner. Assuming that a directed-energy
weapon is identified correctly as a nuclear weapon, the conse-
quence of paragraph 1 would be to prohibit any nation from plac-
ing a directed-energy weapon in outer space in any manner,
including orbit. Standing alone, however, article IV, paragraph 1
in no way restricts spatial deployment of conventional devices, such
as the non-nuclear anti-satellite weapons presently under develop-
ment in both the United States and the Soviet Union. A non-mili-
tary construction of the peaceful purposes clause, coupled with an
extension of that clause's prohibitions to outer space, however,
would operate to proscribe the deployment of such weapons in
space.
Perhaps the most troublesome issue introduced by article IV,
paragraph 2 is whether the peaceful purposes clause applies to
outer space as well as to the moon and other celestial bodies. The
failure of the drafters to include outer space among the enumerated
77. Again, it should be noted that while the United States and the Soviet Union do not
agree on their interpretations of peaceful purposes in relation to the moon and other celestial
bodies, their positions are consonant as to the nature of the permissible activity that may be
carried out in outer space. Despite the non-military and nonaggressive suggestions,
Mankiewicz, Interpretation of the Treaty on Outer Space, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE (1968) notes:
The absence of definitions is not due to bad draftsmenship or pressure of time.
Definitions have been omitted purposely, in order to permit those who undertake
space activities to give their own definition of what they consider to be 'peaceful' or
' the interest of all mankind.'
Id. at 82.
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environments listed in the first sentence of the second paragraph
has raised this issue. Though debate still exists between the Soviet
Union and the United States as to whether peaceful purposes
means non-military or nonaggressive, both basically are in agree-
ment regarding the nature of the activity that one can lawfully un-
dertake in outer space. In fact, although the early Soviet position
was that the peaceful purposes clause applied to outer space, 78 pres-
ently they accept the United States position that it does not. 79 Both
agree that activity undertaken for a military objective is permissible
so long as it is nonaggressive in character.
1. "Peaceful Purposes" Does not Apply to Outer
Space. Commentators who contend that the peaceful purposes
clause does not apply to outer space proper, point out the failure of
the drafters to include that environment. This, they say, indicates
an intention to exclude it from the rule."° There is a great deal of
validity to this position. In fact, during the preparatory work of the
Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space (COPUOS), when the representatives from India and
Argentina proposed that outer space be included in the environ-
ments covered by the peaceful purposes clause, this proposal was
rejected.8' Nevertheless, commentators who deny the extention to
outer space state that the failure to mention outer space ought not
be a license for lawlessness. Article III applies the United Nations
Charter and international law to outer space.8 2 Moreover, article
IV, paragraph 1, in conjunction with the Limited Test Ban Treaty
78. N. MATTE, supra note 27, at 271. On this basis, they objected to the United States
use of reconnaissance satellites. See U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/C.2/L.I, at 2 (1962).
79. Zhukov, On the Question of Interpretation of the Term "Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space" Contained in the Space Treaty, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH COLLOQUIUM ON
THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 36, 37 (1968).
80. Soraghan, supra note 54, at 461. The exclusion of outer space from the peaceful
purposes clause prompted one Dr. Roy to state:
By analyzing the other articles we can see that ever article explicitly says 'the
loon, other celestial bodies and outer space', except Aricle IV in which it is only
said, 'the Moon and other celestial bodies.' Therefore, it is clear that the intention
was present to exclude outer space from Article IV.
Herczeg, Problems of Interpretation of the Space Treaty of 27 January 1967, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE TENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 105, 114 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as Herczeg].
81. U.N. Doe. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.65, at 11 (1966); see also SR.66, at 3, SR.71 and
Add. I at 8-9. Cf The statement of the Soviet representative Morozov that the exclusion of
outer space was due, in part, to the fact that demilitarization of that environment should be
undertaken only in the context of general disarmament. Markoff, supra note 18, at 10, states
that part of the reason was that COPUOS had no general disarmament authority.
82. Herczeg, supra note 80, at 107.
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of 1963,83 prohibit the deployment or detonation of nuclear weap-
ons and other weapons of mass destruction.
2. "Peaceful Purposes"Applies to Outer Space. The nature
of the evidence used by those who continue to insist upon the appli-
cability of the peaceful purposes clause to outer space is varied.84
Some contend that it is incongruous to restrict military activity on
the moon and other celestial bodies and not apply the same rule to
outer space. 85 The most analytical contentions, however, suggest
that the peaceful purposes clause has been expanded to encompass
outer space.86 This has been accomplished through the preamble
and article I, paragraph 1 which calls for the use of space for the
benefit of all countries. This position has a certain appeal, particu-
larly in light of the fact that article XIII states that the "provisions
of [the] Treaty shall apply to activities .. in . . . outer space, in-
cluding the moon and other celestial bodies .... ,87 One of the
provisions of the Treaty is, of course, the peaceful purposes clause.
The whole process of determining whether the peaceful pur-
poses clause applies to outer space is complicated further by the
application of article 32(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. Article 32(a) reads:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation,
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circum-
stances of its conclusion. . . , to determine the meaning when
the interpretation according to Article 3 1(a) leaves the meaning
ambiguous or obscure.88
Thus, resort to the travauxprbparatoires of the Legal Subcommit-
tee, which records the rejection of India and Argentina's proposal,
should not occur when determining if the peaceful purposes clause
applies to outer space unless construction in the context of the other
provisions fails to clarify the matter.
Article I, paragraph 1 requires that the exploration and use of
outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, be car-
ried out for the benefit, and in the interest, of all countries. This
mandate is repeated in the preamble, where General Assembly
83. See Limited Test Ban Treaty, supra note 16. See also comments by Dr. Kopal and
Dr. Roy, id. at 114.
84. Schrader, Space Treaty 1967, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE
LAW OF OUTER SPACE 151, 152 (1967).
85. Markov, supra note 65, at 26.
86. Herczeg, supra note 80, at 106.
87. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. XIII (emphasis added).
88. Vienna Convention, supra note 13, at 293 (emphasis added).
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Resolution 1884, which was designed to prohibit the arms race
from spreading to outer space, is recalled.89 When article IV, para-
graph 2 is construed in this context, the ambiguity may disappear
leaving the preparatory documents to be ignored.
Such a construction, however, creates a significant problem. If
the scope of the peaceful purposes clause is extended to outer space
by a circumlocution of the drafter's actual intent as reflected in the
preparatory works, then the result is an obligation clearly inconsis-
tent with the expectations of the drafters. The cardinal rule of treaty
construction is to posit an interpretation which embodies the basic
objectives of the drafters, and article 32(a) of the Vienna Conven-
tion fails in this particular case. If outer space has been demilitar-
ized, the transforming impetus has come from some provision other
than article IV, paragraph 2.
IV. ARTICLE I, PARAGRAPH 1: DEMILITARIZATION OF OUTER
SPACE
International law consists of two basic types of principles: pro-
hibitive and dispositive. The latter generally are not known in mu-
nicipal law. Prohibitive principles are those rules which express the
consensus of the community of nations that particular conduct does
not extend, or, in fact, threatens, universally shared values. Such
rules are proscriptive in nature. The peaceful purposes clause per-
mits only peaceful uses of the moon and other celestial bodies. In
that sense the clause prohibits all non-peaceful or military activities
from being conducted on the moon and other celestial bodies.90
Outer space is not covered by the prohibitive rule of article IV,
paragraph 2.
Dispositive principles, on the other hand, establish prescriptive
guidelines to be followed in the exercise of permissible conduct.
Frequently they articulate aspirations, but their violation is no less
illegal. Article I, paragraph 1 of the Outer Space Treaty is a disposi-
tive principle. It fixes an obligation upon the parties to take all nec-
89. GAOR Res. 1884, U.N. Doc. A/C.I/L.34, A/Res./1884 (1963).
90. Prohibitory principles are of two basic types. The principles may enumerate the
conduct prohibited (a state cannot do 4, B and C), or they may state that only certain
conduct is permitted (a state can only do A, B and C). The latter prohibits all activity of a
character other than 4, B and C. This is the sense of article IV, para. 2. It states that the
moon and other celestial bodies shall be used "exclusively" for peaceful purposes. Thus,
neither environment may be used for "non-peaceful" or military purposes. Consequently,
while article IV, para. 2 first appears to be a dispositive principle, closer scrutiny reveals its
true character as prohibitory.
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essary steps to effectuate its objective. According to its express
terms, the parties exploring or using outer space must do so in a
fashion that benefits the interests of all countries. Activity with a
military objective can be designed to benefit only the acting na-
tion.9'
To suggest that international law consists of only prohibitive
principles, and that if conduct of a certain character is not prohib-
ited it is permitted, resurrects the logic of the Lotus case.92 The fact
that outer space is not included expressly in the prohibitive rule of
article IV, paragraph 2 does not mean that an analogous provision,
such as article I, paragraph 1, does not operate to provide similar
protection.
The debate may not end soon, particularly in light of the fact
that the major powers agree that peaceful purposes, with all its defi-
nitional vagaries, does not apply to outer space. Yet, it is clear that
proper construction of article IV, paragraph 2 and article I, para-
graph 1 prohibits military activity in all of outer space, including
the moon and other celestial bodies, because such activity cannot
be undertaken in the manner beneficial to the interests of all coun-
tries.93 Realistically, if a nation, in good faith, exhausts the reme-
91. See generally Ambrosini, The Meaning ofthe Romantic Enunciations ofArticle I § 1
ofthe Space Treaty ofJanuary, 1967, Further Outlook on Space (No. 11).
92. The SS. Lotus, [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10; 2 M. HUDSON, WORLD COURT RE-
PORTS 20 (1935). Commentary on the case includes Beckett, Criminal Jurisdiction Over For-
eigners, 8 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 108 (1927); Berge, The Case ofthe S.S. "Lotus", 26 MICH. L.
REV. 361 (1928); Brierly, The "Lotus" Case, 44 LAW Q. REV. 154 (1928). Though the sub-
stantive principle of the Lotus case concerns jurisdiction over accidents on the high seas, it is
cited here for its faulty analytical methodology. The controlling opinion stated that if no
principle of international law exists prohibiting a state from asserting jurisdiction over such
accidents, then that state may do so. Applied to the Outer Space Treaty, the reasoning would
posit that since nonpeaceful activities are not prohibited in outer space proper, then they are
permitted. This reasoning overlooks the dispositive principles of international law. Such
principles are also known in other areas of international law. For instance, the Hague Regu-
lations annexed to the Hague Convention prefaces a series of prohibitions by a preamble
stating that the
High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that in cases not included in
the Regulations. . .. the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protec-
tion and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the
usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the
dictates ofthe public conscience (emphasis added).
The Hague Convention IV of 1907 Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land, Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539. Thus, the basic rules of chivalry, humanity, and mili-
tary necessity not only permeate all the articulated prohibitions, but also act as dispositive
rules filling those gaps not covered by the regulations. See McDougal and Feliciano, Interna-
tional Coercion and World Public Order The General Principle ofthe Law of War, 67 YALE
L.J. 771 (1958); Downey, Law of War and Military Necessity, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 251 (1953).
93. As discussed previously, article I, para. I is a dispositive principle that obligates all
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dial provisions of the Treaty and, yet, is unsuccessful in restraining
another from transgressing article IV, paragraph 2 or article I,
paragraph 1, it would be fatuous to insist upon continued adher-
ence, particularly if the transgression creates a strategic asymmetry
that threatens the continuation of world peace.94
It is apparent that any future deployment of conventional,
non-nuclear, anti-satellite weapons would be violative of the dis-
positive provisions of article I, paragraph 1 that require nations to
use outer space for the benefit and in the interest of all countries.
Moreover, to the extent that either the United States or the Soviet
Union attempts to characterize a directed-energy weapon as a non-
nuclear device, unaffected by article IV, paragraph 1, article IV,
parties to use space for the benefit and in the interests of all countries. In fact, the mandatory
nature of the obligation is enhanced by the fact that when the legal subcommittee of
COPUOS debated the idea of removing the "benefit" clause from the operational articles
and placing it in the preamble, the committee rejected the suggestion. See the proposal of
Mr. Rao of India, Summary Report of 63d meeting, 5th Sess. of Legal Subcommittee of
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.63, at 7
(1966). This clearly indicates an intention to create a binding obligation. See the statement of
Mr. Darwin of United Kingdom, Summary Report of 10th meeting, 5th Sess. of Legal Sub-
committee of Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/C.2/SR.70, at 4 (1966). Manfred Lachs, former Chairman of the Legal Subcom-
mittee, in THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 106 (1972), indicates that, if nonaggressive activity is
permitted in outer space, there is no need to have the preamble apply peaceful purposes to
outer space, nor to include the language of article I, para. 1 in the Treaty.
94. Any ambiguity in an international convention may be clarified by subsequent
"state practice." Though some may suggest that the use of reconnaissance satellites by both
the United States and the Soviet Union has militarized outer space, the practice, in actuality,
has operated merely to legitimize the specific activity of reconnaissance. New, futuristic mili-
tary uses still are prohibited. The accepted use of space for a single military objective does
not transform all of space and thereby legitimize all military uses. To the extent that recon-
naissance increases a nation's ability to keep track of military development and deployment,
it increases that nation's willingness to enter into arms control agreements. This is so because
the degree of adherence to present or contemplated agreements is readily verifiable. More-
over, if one of the factors contributing to the arms race is the concept of action/reaction, then
reconnaissance has taken responses in reaction to imagined buildups out of the dark. Thus,
not only is it possible that subsequent state practice has legitimized the use of reconnaissance
satellites, see Stein, supra note 39, at 263, but the use actually has operated to conserve the
values of well-being and security by enhancing the likelihood of efficacious arms control
agreements. The deployment of anti-satellite weapons will not only be a new use of space for
a military objective prohibited by article I, para. 1, but will also threaten the values con-
served by the use of reconnaissance satellites. Destruction of the power to observe will
dampen the desire to enter into new, or abide by existing, arms control agreements. Worse,
the nation using the ASAT weapon may be tempted to launch a disarming first strike in
order to neutralize the most recent location data of the other nation. The nation making such
a decision may do so thinking that a quick relocation of its forces will permit it to emerge
victorious from a nuclear conflict. The converse, however, may also be true. A nation that
recently has had its reconnaissance satellites destroyed may decide it is imperative to quickly
launch an attack to take advantage of the latest location data.
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paragraph 2 renders such a characterization an ineffective method
of circumventing the Treaty. Both article IV, paragraph 2 and arti-
cle I, paragraph 1 strike at non-nuclear devices. Additionally, both
prohibit any activity with a military objective from being under-
taken lawfully in outer space, including the moon and other celes-
tial bodies.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
As long as disputes over the meaning of peaceful purposes and
the clause's applicability to outer space proper continue, nations
possessing the technological capability to do so surely will continue
to use outer space for military objectives. If this is to be prevented,
the nations of the world, behind the leadership of the United States
and the Soviet Union, should endeavor to reaffirm their commit-
ment to the mandate of article I, paragraph L" Activity inuring to
the benefit of a sole nation should be prohibited. Only activity
designed to distribute the benefits of space use to the largest
number of participants should be permitted. Such a distribution
will guarantee almost universal support for the Outer Space Treaty
and will insulate the celestial realm from the depredations of mili-
tary activity. The most perfect method for accomplishing this objec-
tive would be to amend the specific problem provisions of the Outer
Space Treaty. But, in light of the fact that the United States and the
Soviet Union are the major military users of outer space, a bilateral
arrangement prohibiting the use of outer space for military pur-
poses may prove adequate.
An amended draft of article IV, designed to promote as well as
conserve the values of security and well-being, might read:
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit in
outer space, including orbit around the moon and other celestial
bodies, any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds
of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on the
moon and other celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer
space, including on the moon and other celestial bodies, in any
manner.
Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies,
shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for
95. The United States and the Soviet Union continue to attempt extension of the peace-
ful purposes clause to outer space for certain activities. See Agreement Between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning Cooperation in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes, May 24, 1972, [19721 U.S.T.
867, T.I.A.S. No. 3747. See also a similar agreement in 76 DEP'T STATE BULL. 644 (1977).
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peaceful purposes. There shall be prohibited, inter alia, any
measures of a military nature such as the establishment of mili-
tary bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any
type of weapons, and the conduct of military maneuvers, pro-
vided that nothing contained in this article shall prohibit any
States Parties to the Treaty from undertaking measures of mili-
tary assessment and arms-control verification. The use of any
equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall not be
prohibited.
Language to this effect would successfully eliminate contro-
versy over the international legality of the deployment of nuclear
and other weapons of mass destruction. By the express terms of the
first paragraph, parties to the Treaty would be prohibited from
placing nuclear or comparable weapons of mass destruction in orbit
in outer space, whether around the earth, the moon, or any other
celestial body. Similarly, the stationing or installation of such
weapons in outer space, or on the moon or any other celestial body,
would be prohibited.
The second paragraph, moreover, would fix upon all parties
the obligation to use the entire celestial realm exclusively for peace-
ful purposes. The second sentence of article IV, paragraph 2 would
clarify the confusion over the meaning of peaceful purposes by
prohibiting all activity of a military nature, no matter how charac-
terized. Nevertheless, the proviso following the general prohibition
would permit military assessment and arms control verification
measures. This not only takes into account the present existence of
orbiting reconnaissance satellites, but also, in the nuclear age, the
inherent value promoting, value conserving aspects of such activity.
If these values are to be protected in the future with a mini-
mum of controversy, then any arrangement-amendment of article
IV or bilateral treaty between the United States and the Soviet
Union-should contain language similar to, and at least as compre-
hensive as, that suggested above. Notwithstanding a clarification of
sorts, however, the Treaty's present language, as the foregoing dis-
cussion has revealed, prohibits deployment of anti-satellite wea-
pons.
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